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THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW
YORK STATE: LEGISLATIVE
INITIATIVES AND BEYOND
David L. Markell*
INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine that is
designed to safeguard the public's rights in certain waters and
lands underwater.1 It does so by making each state the "trustee"
* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School; J.D. 1979, University of Vir-
ginia; B.A. 1975, Brandeis University. Prior to joining the Law School's faculty in
1992, Professor Markell worked both in state government (as Director of the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation's Division of Environ-
mental Enforcement) and in the federal government (with the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice's Environmental
Enforcement Section).
I would like to thank Amy Petragnani and Lorraine Lewandrowski for their
research assistance in connection with this article.
' The specific geographic scope of the public trust doctrine in New York State
is discussed in more detail infra part I.A. For a more full discussion of the public
trust doctrine, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 2.16 (Supp. 1984); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986). Summarizing this doctrine in a single sentence is not
intended to mask its complexity. Writing about the public trust doctrine in his
Handbook on Environmental Law, Professor Rodgers characterizes the difficulty
in defining and understanding this ancient doctrine as follows: "[R]esoundingly
vague, obscure in origin and uncertain of purpose; it serves a variety of functions,
mimics other doctrines, and for these reasons is not easily researchable." ROD-
GERS, supra § 2.16, at 59 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, other commentators have
concluded that deciphering the nature of the public trust doctrine is no simple
task. For example, Professor Lloyd Cohen believes that analysis of the public
trust doctrine is best advanced by treating it as three different doctrines: (1) "the
public trust doctrine that was" (the English common law that evolved over sev-
eral centuries); (2) "the public trust doctrine that is" (the contemporary Ameri-
can "jumbled body of case law and commentary"); and (3) "[the] public trust
doctrine that ought to be" (a principle that would prevent destruction of commu-
nal property). Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Per-
spective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 240 (1992); see also David C. Slade, Public Trust
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responsible for protecting these rights. This Article identifies a
number of issues relating to the future application of the public
trust doctrine in New York State. The Article uses New York
State's recently enacted Underwater Lands Bill2 as a vehicle for
identifying several of these issues. Part I briefly summarizes the
public trust doctrine itself, as well as its recent partial codification
in New York State's Underwater Lands Bill.3 Part II discusses is-
sues relating to the implementation of the Underwater Lands Bill
based upon public trust doctrine principles.4 Part III identifies a
potential downside of the state's property interest in public trust
resources.
5
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND A
SUMMARY OF THE UNDERWATER LANDS BILL
A. A Brief History of the Public Trust Doctrine
Under the public trust doctrine, each state is responsible, as a
"trustee," for safeguarding public rights in the lands and waters
covered by the doctrine for common uses, such as navigation, com-
merce, and recreation.' Two titles are traditionally vested in these
public lands and waters.7 A "dominant" title, the jus publicum,
Doctrine-101, in THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
OF LANDS, WATER AND LIVING RESOURCES 55, 55 (Albany Law School Government
Law Center ed., 1991) (concluding that the doctrine is "an amazingly complex
body of law"); Ted J. Hannig, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion
and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211, 212
(1983) (stating that the public trust doctrine is "imbued with as much lore and
confusion as were the sea dragons once rumored to exist in the [Roman and En-
glish] waters").
2 Act of Aug. 7, 1992, ch. 791, 1992 N.Y. Laws 4028 (codified as amended at
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-0503(1), (4), 70-0117(5)(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp.
1994); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 911(10)-(11), 915-b, 922 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y.
PUB. LANDS LAW §§ 8, 30-a(1), 75(7) (McKinney 1993)). This article refers to
Chapter 791 of the New York Laws of 1992 by its informal, unofficial title, the
Underwater Lands Bill. This Bill does not have a formal title. It amends the Pub-
lic Lands Law, the Environmental Conservation Law, and the Executive Law by,
inter alia, requiring parties to obtain a lease, easement, or permit in order to erect
structures over, or to fill, underwater lands. Id., 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4028.
3 See infra part I.
" See infra part II.
5 See infra part III.
6 DIVISION OF COASTAL RESOURCES & WATERFRONT REVITALIZATION, N.Y. DEP'T
OF STATE, PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE NEW YORK SHORELINE 30-32 (1988) [hereinafter
PUBLIC ACCESS].
I See People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 523 (N.Y. 1916); Slade,
supra note 1, at 63.
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represents the public's rights, while a "subservient" title, the jus
privatum, represents any "private proprietary rights in the use and
possession of trust lands."'8
In its seminal decision on the public trust doctrine, which it is-
sued more than one century ago, the United States Supreme Court
defined the scope of a state's responsibilities as trustee of the lands
and waters covered by the public trust doctrine to include the au-
thority to convey away the jus privatum to private persons, so long
as the jus publicum, or interests of the public, are not impaired:
[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control
of private parties ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of peace."
States retain considerable flexibility within this general frame-
work that the Supreme Court articulated in 1892. This flexibility
allows states to shape the scope of the public trust doctrine in
terms of the precise lands and waters it covers, the nature of the
public's rights, and the extent of the state's discretion to convey
those rights.'0 As a result, the doctrine has evolved differently in
various states. 1
8 Slade, supra note 1, at 63.
9 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (holding that the Illi-
nois legislature's conveyance of 1000 acres of submerged and filled tidal lands that
were part of the Chicago harbor was revokable because it was inconsistent with
the legislature's exercise of its public trust responsibilities).
10 The authors of Putting The Public Trust Doctrine to Work summarize the
states' public trust powers and authorities as follows: the power to "govern, man-
age and protect" public rights in public trust lands and waters; continued "super-
vision and control" over these lands; authority to define the boundaries and limits
of public trust lands; power to convey away the just privatum; revocation power
over conveyances which "unduly diminish[] or destroy[] the State's jus publicum
in public lands"; authority to "require leases for structures" built upon trust
lands; and regulation of fishing. David C. Slade et al., State Powers, Duties, Limi-
tations and Prohibitions Under the Public Trust Doctrine, in PUTTING THE PUB-
LIc TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL
STATES 213, 215 (David C. Slade ed., 1990).
" "The variability among state public trust doctrines was acknowledged as
early as 1894 by the Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby." Cynthia Carlson, Fed-
eral Property and the Preemption of State Public Trust Doctrines, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 n.1 (Jan. 1990); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 40 (1894) (holding "that the title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in
the soil below high water mark .. .are governed by the local laws of the several
States, subject . . . to the rights granted to the United States by the
Constitution.").
1994]
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Regarding the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine fol-
lowing the American Revolution, the states assumed title to public
trust lands under navigable waters and tidelands that had not been
conveyed away by the British through grants or patents. 12 In New
York, as the United States Supreme Court noted in 1894 in
Shively v. Bowlby, the "State succeeded to all the rights of the
Crown and Parliament of England in lands under tide waters ...
-)13 While no official estimates are available as to the precise acre-
age or square mileage of public trust land within New York State, 4
it is clear that the public trust doctrine covers considerable lands
underwater. For example, large navigable lakes such as Onondaga
Lake, Seneca Lake, Cayuga Lake, and Lake George are covered by
the public trust doctrine.' 5 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that the public trust doctrine also applies to the portions of the
Great Lakes from the low water mark to the international bound-
ary with Canada or the boundary with another state.'6
Individual states have also defined, as a matter of state law, the
protected public trust uses of lands and waters covered by the
public trust doctrine. Over time, the doctrine has been held to pro-
tect an expanding list of public uses.' New York courts have pro-
12 See David C. Slade et al., Lands, Waters and Living Resources Subject to
the Public Trust Doctrine, in PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK,
supra note 10, at 13, 16-17. In England, the definition of "navigability" was con-
strued to mean waters subject to "the ebb and flow of the tide." Illinois Cent.
R.R., 146 U.S. at 435. American courts, however, labeled the terms "navigable
waters" and "tidelands" synonymously since "in England no waters are navigable
in fact which are not subject to the tide." Id.
13 Shively, 152 U.S. at 20-21; see also N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 4 (McKinney
1993) (providing that all lands belonging to the Crown before July 9, 1776, are
vested in the people of the State of New York). Prior to the Revolution, the Brit-
ish had conveyed large sections of New York to individuals and local govern-
ments. See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 403 (1842). For a
detailed history of the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine on Long Is-
land, see William L. Sharp, Long Island Colonial Patents and the Public Trust
Doctrine, in THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF
LANDS, WATER AND LIVING RESOURCES, supra note 1, app. For a detailed discus-
sion of the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine's application in New
York State, see PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 6, at 142-46.
14 Telephone Interview with William L. Sharp, Senior Attorney, New York De-
partment of State (Aug. 27, 1993).
'5 Patricia E. Salkin, Overview of the Public Trust Doctrine in New York, in
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF LANDS,
WATER AND LIVING RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 73, 76.
16 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892).
" See David Brower, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Overview, in THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE: THE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATER AND LIVING
RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 1, 10-12.
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tected the traditional public trust uses of commerce, navigation,
and fishing. 18 Additionally, New York courts have held that the
state may use its public trust powers to protect recreational uses
such as lounging, reading, and even pushing baby strollers on the
foreshore.19 Finally, one New York lower court has expanded the
public trust doctrine to encompass ecological concerns: "The pub-
lic interest demands the preservation and conservation of this vital
natural resource and the enforcement of protective measures
against infringements by nominal owners, be they private or gov-
ernmental."2 ° "The entire ecological system supporting the water-
ways is an integral part of them . . and must necessarily be
included within the purview of the trust."'"
11 Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 482 (1883) ("The sovereign right...
was based upon the public benefits in promoting trade and commerce, supposed
to be derived from keeping open navigable bodies of water as public highways for
the common use of the people."); see also Lawton v. Steele, 23 N.E. 878, 879
(N.Y. 1890) (upholding the state's right to protect and regulate fishing in public
waters), aff'd, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); People v. Johnson, 166 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (Sup.
Ct. 1957) ("At common law, the public ordinarily had the right to hunt and fish in
waters subject to the public right of navigation.").
19 Tucci v. Salzhauer, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd, 307 N.E.2d
256 (N.Y. 1973). The gathering of seaweed as a public trust right, however, has
been explicitly rejected in New York. People v. Brennan, 255 N.Y.S. 331, 335
(Sup. Ct. 1931) (noting that "[iut has long been settled law that the public cannot
gather seaweed from the foreshore.").
20 People of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (Dist. Ct. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1973).
21 Id. Various other states similarly have added protection of environmental
and scenic beauty as well as simple existence value to the roster of valid public
uses that the doctrine encompasses. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d
362 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980), for example, expands the public trust
doctrine to include the tidal lands' preservation "in their natural state as ecologi-
cal units for scientific study." Id. at 365. Other expansive applications of the pub-
lic trust doctrine include its use to invalidate the grant of a lease of public
parkland for use as a ski resort development, Gould v. Greylock Reservation
Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Mass. 1966), the protection of a lake's scenic views
and use for bird habitat, National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,
711 (Cal.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), and the restoration of non-
residents' public access to municipally-owned beaches, Matthews v. Bay Head Im-
provement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). See
also Lazarus, supra note 1, at 632 ("Tantamount to an academic call to legal arms
on behalf of the natural environment, the public trust thesis has borne judicial
fruit. In circumstances radically beyond the trust doctrine's historical confines,
courts over the last fifteen years have repeatedly invoked the doctrine in litigation
brought to halt environmentally destructive activities."); Joseph L. Sax, The Pub-
lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970) (characterizing the public trust doctrine as the most
promising legal tool to prevent destruction of natural resources). Professor Sax
noted: "Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine
1994]
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Debate continues concerning the extent to which New York
courts should sanction state conveyances of underwater lands that
terminate the state's jus publicum interest.22 While the New York
courts have not sanctioned conveyances that totally abdicate pub-
lic trust responsibilities,23 they have allowed conveyances of lands
out of the public trust when, in their view, doing so furthers the
public interest.24 In People v. Steeplechase Park Co.,25 for exam-
ple, the New York Court of Appeals upheld an unrestricted con-
veyance of foreshore and submerged lands to a Coney Island
amusement park that had absolutely excluded the public.26 The
only restriction upon this conveyance, as well as upon thousands of
other pre-existing conveyances, was that it "c[ould] be done with-
out substantial impairment of the public interest[]. ' 27
B. The Underwater Lands Bill
The 1992 Underwater Lands Bill is a good place to begin the
seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as
a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal
approach to resource management problems." Id.
22 Compare Leslie Allan, Government Conveyances of Trust Lands: Can the
Public's Interest Ever Be Extinguished, in AFTER Lucas: The Public Trust Doc-
trine and Public Nuisance Law in New York 49 (Albany Law School Government
Law Center ed., 1993) with Sanford Strenger, Government Conveyances of Trust
Lands: Can the Public's Interest Ever Be Extinguished, in AFTER Lucas: The
Public Trust Doctrine and Public Nuisance Law in New York, supra at 59.
23 Coxe v. State, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (N.Y 1895) ("[A] trust is ingrafted upon ...
[the seacoast and shores of tidal rivers] for the benefit of the public, of which the
state is powerless to divest itself.").
24 In Coxe, the court held that the state could not surrender or alienate its title
"except for some public purpose." Id. at 402; see Salkin, supra note 15, at 84-85.
For a review of restrictions placed by other states on conveyances of public trust
lands, see David C. Slade et al., The Conveyance of Public Trust Land and the
Nature of the Remaining Servitude, in PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
WORK, supra note 10, at 175, 175-80.
25 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916).
2 Id. at 526.
21 Id. New York State's prerogative to convey trust lands to private hands has
been recognized by the Supreme Court:
[U]nder the law of New York when these cases were decided, whenever the
legislature deemed it to be in the public interest to grant a deed in fee sim-
ple to land under tidal waters and exclude itself from its exercise as sover-
eign of the jus publicum, that is, the power to preserve and regulate
navigation, it might do so; but that.., conclusion that it had thus excluded
the jus publicum could only be reached upon clear evidence of its intention
and of the public interest in promotion of which it acted.
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1925).
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process of considering future legislative developments involving
the public trust doctrine because it represents the New York State
legislature's latest thinking on the doctrine. The Bill partially codi-
fies the public trust doctrine by providing explicitly that the state's
authority to convey interests in lands underwater is limited to situ-
ations in which it is in the public interest to do so:
This section authorizes grants, leases, easements, and lesser inter-
ests . . . for the use of state-owned land underwater . . . consistent
with the public interest in the use of state-owned lands underwater
for purposes of navigation, commerce, fishing, bathing, and recrea-
tion; environmental protection; and access to the navigable waters of
the state .... 21
It appears that the decision to partially codify the public trust
doctrine stemmed, at least in part, from the recognition that the
state needed to improve its practices in conveying underwater
lands to ensure that in doing so, it furthered and protected the
public's interest in those lands. As Governor Mario Cuomo stated
in his approval memorandum:
[T]he Governor's Task Force on Coastal Resources... urged that
State procedures for real property transactions in lands now or for-
merly under water be improved to ensure that the public's interest
in those lands is fully considered.
The bill, part of my 1992 legislative program, will address those
needs ....
Given the absence of sufficient control, there are increasing num-
bers of inappropriate in-water projects, and projects with limited
water frontage and disproportionate in-water development. Fre-
28 Act of Aug. 7, 1992, ch. 791, § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 4028, 4029 (emphasis
added) (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(a) (McKinney
1993)); see also Memorandum from Cheryl Parsons Reul, Special Counsel to the
Secretary of State, to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (Aug. 5, 1992)
[hereinafter Reul Memorandum] (on file with author) ("[Tihe measure would
codify in many respects the common law 'public trust doctrine' which recognizes
that the State, as sovereign, holds the tidelands and navigable waters in trust for
the use and enjoyment of the public. The new statutory obligation is reinforced
by a new paragraph f. of section 75 which requires the Commissioner to consider
the public trust and other factors when promulgating rules for the issuance of
leases, easements and other interests. Grants of underwater lands, including con-
version grants, may be made only in exceptional circumstances and consistent
with the public purposes of the section."); Memorandum from Hudson River
Sloop Clearwater, Inc., to Senator Ralph Marino, New York State Senate (July
17, 1992) (on file with author) ("Hudson River Sloop Clearwater strongly supports
this bill because of the much needed protection it provides for the natural re-
source values of underwater lands, and the public's long standing rights and inter-
ests in these lands, as provided by the Public Trust Doctrine.").
1994] 103
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quently, this development is wholly at odds with the character of
adjoining lands, infringes the legitimate interests of existing private
landowners, and is inconsistent with the public interests in safety,
coherent development, environmental preservation, and fair com-
pensation for a public resource ....
The bill [is] our first major step in solving these problems
The legislature establishes two primary mechanisms in the Un-
derwater Lands Bill to ensure that conveyances of state-owned
lands underwater do not impair the public's interest in such lands
underwater. First, the Bill requires that any conveyance contain
conditions necessary to protect the public interest:
In making any grant, lease, permit, or other conveyance, the com-
missioner of general services shall, upon administrative findings, and
to the extent practicable, reserve such interests or attach such con-
ditions to preserve the public interest in the use of state-owned
lands underwater and waterways for navigation, commerce, fishing,
bathing, recreation, environmental protection and access to the nav-
igable waters of the state, with due regard for the need of affected
owners of private property to safeguard their property.30
Second, the bill severely restricts the state's ability to make
grants of lands underwater by limiting such grants to "extraordi-
nary circumstances": "The commissioner [of OGS] .. .shall pro-
mulgate . . . regulations [that] shall include . . . limitations on
grants . . .with respect to underwater lands . . . limiting such
29 Memorandum from Gov. Mario Cuomo filed with the Senate Bill No. 8947-A
(Aug. 7, 1992) (on file with author); see also Budget Report on Bills, N.Y.S. 8947-
A, 1992 Sess. 3 [hereinafter Report on Bills] (on file with author) ("[T]his legisla-
tion is aimed at controlling the potential 'overdevelopment' of shoreline real prop-
erty by marinas and by other types of commercial enterprises in ways that are
detrimental (a) to the environment, (b) to the value of surrounding properties,
and (c) to scenic and other forms of enjoyment by members of the general pub-
lic."); Memorandum from Orin Lehman, Commissioner, Parks, Recreation and
Historic Preservation, State of New York, to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the
Governor 2 (Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with author) ("[Tihe bill provides a much-
needed scheme for the control of rapidly proliferating docks in the State's waters
in a way that addresses the many competing interests."); Reul Memorandum,
supra note 28, at 1 ("The bill fulfills several of the legislative recommendations of
the Governor's Task Force on Coastal Resources. In its report, the Task Force
recommended that management of state owned underwater lands be improved;
that procedures be instituted to ensure that environmental and public trust fac-
tors be considered in decisions concerning state owned under water lands ....
These objectives are accomplished in the proposed legislation.").
30 Act of Aug. 7, 1992, § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4029 (emphasis added) (codified
as amended at N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(f) (McKinney 1993)).
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grants to exceptional circumstances ....
Other important features of this law, from a public trust per-
spective, include the following:
1. In authorizing the Office General Services to convey various in-
terests in state lands underwater, the Underwater Lands Bill:
(a) requires the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation
and the Secretary of State to review such proposed conveyances; 32
(b) requires the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation to
recommend conditions to protect the environment and natural re-
sources; 3 and
(c) requires the Commissioner of General Services to incorporate
these conditions in any lease, easement, permit, or other interest
"giving due regard . . . to the recommendations of the Secretary of
State with respect to coastal issues" or to deny the proposal if the
Commissioner of Environmental Conservation "determines that the
environmental or natural resources cannot be adequately
protected."3 '
2. It authorizes the Commissioner of General Services to impose a
fee in connection with the issuance of any interest in public lands. 35
3. It authorizes the Commissioner of General Services to transfer
jurisdiction over state-owned lands underwater to another state
agency "for the purpose of protecting environmentally sensitive
lands underwater."36
4. It requires the Commissioner of General Services to promulgate
such regulations with respect to the issuance of any interest in pub-
lic lands as the Commissioner deems "reasonable and necessary" to
protect the interests of the people in such lands underwater. 37 These
regulations are required to address the following issues, among
others: the fees to be charged; the environmental impact of the pro-
s' Id., 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4032 (emphasis added) (codified at N.Y. PUB. LANDS
LAW § 75(7)(f)). The Office of General Services' (OGS) regulations to implement
the Underwater Lands Bill were proposed on September 1, 1993. 15 N.Y. St. Reg.
16-18 (Sept. 1, 1993). They were still in proposed form as of December 31, 1993.
The proposed regulations fail to define the term "extraordinary circumstances."
See generally id. They do, however, provide that "[g]rants of land [underwater
shall be] limited to exceptional circumstances" and only to those conveyances
that will not impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining, based
upon factors set forth in Section 270-3.2. Id. at 16.
32 Act of Aug. 7, 1992, § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4030 (codified at N.Y. PUB. LANDS
LAW § 75(7)(d)(i) (McKinney 1993)).
33 Id., 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4031 (codified at N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(d)(i)).
34 Id.
35 Id. (codified at N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(e)(i) (McKinney 1993)).
36 Id., 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4029 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW
§ 75(7)(a)).
37 Id., 1992 N.Y. Laws at 4032 (codified at N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(f)).
1994] 105
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ject; the values for natural resource management, recreational uses,
and commercial uses of the pertinent underwater land; and the ef-
fect of the project on the natural resource interests of the state in
the lands. 8
II. ISSUES RELATING TO THE UNDERWATER LANDS BILL
A. The Functional Allocation of Responsibilities
The functional allocation of responsibilities in the 1992 Under-
water Lands Bill raises several important issues. First, in several
different ways, it raises an issue concerning the appropriate rela-
tionship between the state's position as trustee for public resources
and the state's exercise of its police power. The police power pro-
vides the states with legal authority to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.3 9 On the other hand, the public
trust doctrine has been a source of government power protecting
public interests specific to lands beneath "navigable waters."
The Underwater Lands Bill continues the allocation of these two
different functions to different agencies. At the same time, how-
ever, the Bill requires a convergence of these functions, and recog-
nizes the possibility of their further institutional consolidation in
the future. Thus, the Bill recognizes OGS remains responsible for
administering public trust lands.4 ° It also gives OGS responsibility
and authority to convey various types of interests in these lands."1
The Underwater Lands Bill, however, also gives the state's envi-
ronmental regulatory agency, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC), a role to play in ensuring that
such conveyances do not inappropriately or unnecessarily jeopard-
ize the state's environment or natural resources. 2 DEC's role is not
merely a consultative one. In addition to retaining its regulatory
responsibilities, DEC essentially has veto power over OGS' exercise
of its trustee responsibilities. 3
38 Id.
39 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
40 See generally N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7) (McKinney 1993).
41 Id. § 75(7)(a).
42 Id. § 75(7)(d)(i).
'3 See id. The law provides that the Commissioner of General Services shall
incorporate DEC conditions in any conveyance or shall deny a proposal "if the
Commissioner of Environmental Conservation . . . determines that the environ-
ment or natural resources cannot be adequately protected." Id. As one example of
DEC's retention of regulatory power, the law expressly provides that OGS' juris-
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Additionally, the law promotes the possibility of further consoli-
dation of responsibility for public trust lands by explicitly recog-
nizing that it may be appropriate for OGS to transfer the trustee
responsibilities to another agency, such as DEC, for the purpose of
protecting environmentally sensitive lands underwater.44
It is worth exploring the dimensions of this issue in more detail.
First, does it make sense for the state to maintain divided respon-
sibility for public trust lands? Is a structure that provides for mul-
tiple agency reviews of proposed conveyances the most efficient
structure for achieving the Bill's purposes? The Division of the
Budget raises this issue in its comments on the Bill, noting:
[B]y requiring that DEC and [the Department of State,] as well as
OGS review each application to build a new structure on underwater
land to which the State holds nominal title, it could be argued that
enactment of this measure would establish an unwarranted, highly
inefficient, and relatively costly layer of government regulation af-
fecting various types of parties who build docks and other structures
on underwater lands in New York State.45
diction does not extend to discharge or intake pipes, pipelines, cables, or conduits.
Id. § 75(7)(b). By creating a central role for DEC that empowers DEC to evalu-
ate, condition, and even deny conveyances, the Underwater Lands Bill takes a big
step toward avoiding the potential conflict of interest that the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (West 1977 &
Supp. 1993), creates.
The federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988), takes an
approach similar to that adopted in the Underwater Lands Bill. The Endangered
Species Act also requires the agency that approves an action to consult with an
expert agency before doing so. Id. § 1536. Under the Endangered Species Act, the
"expert" agency is brought into the process at two junctures. First, the proponent
agency must ask the Fish & Wildlife Service whether any threatened or endan-
gered species may be present. Id. § 1536(a)(2). If the answer is affirmative, the
burden shifts to the proponent agency to conduct a "biological assessment" to
determine whether such a species is "likely to be affected" by the action. Id.
§ 1536(c)(1). If the assessment concludes that the species is likely to be affected,
the Fish & Wildlife Service is called on again, this time to prepare a formal "bio-
logical opinion." Id. If the biological opinion concludes that the species would bejeopardized by the action or its critical habitat destroyed or adversely modified, it
will be very difficult for the proponent agency to go forward.
44 N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(c). As DEC Executive Deputy Commissioner J.
Langdon Marsh pointed out in his paper for the 1991 Albany Law School Govern-
ment Law Center Public Trust Conference, in addition to OGS' administration of
public trust resources, DEC currently administers certain such resources as well.
These include underwater lands where "natural resource values.., predominate."
J. Langdon Marsh, Protection of Natural Resources, in THE PUBLIC TRUST Doc-
TRINE: THE OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATER AND LIVING RE-
SOURCES, supra note 1, at 101, 103.
'0 Report on Bills, supra note 29, at 5.
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Second, what role should each agency play if responsibilities re-
main divided? If, in recognition of DEC's expertise in protecting
the environment and natural resources of the state, DEC has been
assigned responsibility for ensuring that conveyances of interests
in such resources are acceptable from an environmental perspec-
tive, what should be OGS' role? It appears that, at a minimum,
there is a need for close coordination among DEC, OGS, and the
Department of State in the regulation-drafting process, given the
statutory mandate that such regulations require conveyances to in-
corporate natural resource and environmental protection concerns,
which appear to be primarily within the purview of DEC.
Third, assuming that this framework of divided functions is re-
tained, thought should be given to the proper implementation of
the statutory authorization for OGS to transfer jurisdiction in cer-
tain instances. The statute is silent on this issue, other than its
direction that OGS may transfer jurisdiction for the purpose of
protecting environmentally sensitive lands underwater." The con-
cept of "environmentally sensitive lands" is not defined in the stat-
ute. Similarly, the Underwater Lands Bill fails to provide guidance
as to the criteria OGS should use in deciding whether such a trans-
fer is warranted.
The proposed regulations to implement the Underwater Lands
Bill do not define "environmentally sensitive lands." The proposed
regulations suggest, however, that in practice, the transfer of lands
to another agency will be limited.47 First, it appears that the pro-
posed regulations do not provide for OGS sua sponte to determine
that certain lands underwater are "environmentally sensitive" and
therefore should be transferred to another state agency. 48 Instead,
the proposed regulations appear to contemplate that such lands
underwater will be transferred only if the "recipient" agency re-
quests the transfer. 9
Second, the proposed regulations provide that lands underwater
4 N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(a).
, See 15 N.Y. St. Reg. 16-18 (Sept. 1, 1993).
48 Id.
"' See Office of Gen. Servs., N.Y. Executive Dep't, Draft Regulations, Lands
Underwater: Grants, Easements, Leases, Permits 33 [hereinafter Draft Regula-
tions] (to be codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 270-9.1) (on file
with the Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology) ("[Ulpon the applica-
tion of any State department or a division, bureau or agency thereof, or upon the
application of any State agency, the Commissioner may transfer to such State
department State-owned lands underwater to such agency for the purpose of pro-
tecting environmentally sensitive lands underwater.") (emphasis added).
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must be of "unique environmental sensitivity" to qualify for trans-
fer.5" The state's Open Space Plan recommends an alternative ap-
proach, indicating that "all underwater lands in State ownership
should be reviewed and those underwater lands where natural re-
source values clearly predominate should be transferred to DEC or
[the] Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation
[(OPRHP)] for management."51 The involved state agencies need
to work closely together, along with the affected communities, in
order to develop a coherent and sensible answer to this issue.
B. Fees and Valuation of Natural Resources Within the
Context of the Public Trust Doctrine
Another significant set of issues relates to the methodologies for
determining: (1) whether, in light of the "value"52 of a particular
parcel of state-owned underwater land, a conveyance should be
granted;53 (2) the "environmental impact" of the project and the
"effect of the project on the natural resource interests of the
state"; 4 (3) the conditions, if any, which should be placed on the
project to protect the environment and natural resources;55 and (4)
the monetary fee to be charged for conveying an interest in the
parcel.5" The governing legislation provides little guidance regard-
50 Id. (emphasis added).
"' DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION & OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND
HISTORIC PRESERVATION, CONSERVING OPEN SPACE IN NEW YORK STATE: PLAN AND
FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 184 (1992) [hereinafter CON-
SERVING OPEN SPACE] (emphasis added). In formulating this plan, state agencies
worked through regional advisory committees comprised of knowledgeable citi-
zens who made recommendations on regional land acquisition priorities. The re-
gional advisory committee structure was created through 1990 amendments to
Article 49 of the Environmental Conservation Law. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 49-0209 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
62 For a discussion of approaches to "valuing" resources and the impact upon
them, see infra notes 76-110 and accompanying text.
5' Section 75(7) of the Public Lands Law authorizes DEC to require OGS to
deny a request for a conveyance upon a determination that the environment or
natural resources cannot be adequately protected. N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW
§ 75(7)(d)(i). OGS, in exercising its authority, also has the discretion to condition
or even to disallow the use of a state resource based on environmental or other
relevant impact, subject to judicial review based on the rational basis standard.
Schwartz v. Hudacs, 566 N.Y.S.2d 435, 439-40 (Sup. Ct. 1990). DEC has similar
discretion in exercising its regulatory authority. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
6, § 621.9 (1988).
11 N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(f).
55 Id. § 75(7)(d)(i).
56 Id. § 75(7)(f).
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ing the first three of these issues. Concerning the fourth, the legis-
lation establishes artificial limits that may result in state
subsidization of the use of its public trust resources. 7
The state needs to determine whether there are certain circum-
stances under which it should "reserve" its underwater lands and
deny any request for conveyances. As noted above, both the Un-
derwater Lands Bill, itself, and the case law authorize the state to
reserve lands underwater in appropriate circumstances. 8 In imple-
menting this law, the state should establish criteria to help it make
this judgment.
The Governor's Task Force on Coastal Resources provides a pro-
posed criterion, recommending that the sale or lease of public
lands be limited to instances in which no adverse impact on coastal
water quality or natural resources will occur.5 OGS should con-
sider the work of other groups as well. A significant market in un-
developed lands with the intent of preservation of such lands for
their scenic, wilderness, habitat, or recreational characteristics is
currently developing." Various groups have begun to develop "rel-
atively comprehensive and sophisticated procedures for identifying
and prioritizing properties for acquisition.""1 Moreover, the Nature
Conservancy has developed a structure to identify and design na-
ture reserves in order to protect the land and provide for long term
See id.
68 See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
59 GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COASTAL RESOURCES: NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE:
A VISION FOR NEW YORK'S COAST 40-46 (1991) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE]. The Commission makes numerous additional recommendations in the ar-
eas of: (1) enhancement of coastal water quality, id. at 40, (2) protection of coastal
habitats, including "net gain" in quality and quantity of wetlands, coordination of
state and federal agencies in reference to habitat management, and improvement
of wetlands data, id. at 47, (3) participation in the North American Waterfowl
Management Plan, and protection of significant habitats, id. at 49, (4) the man-
agement of fishery resources (coordinated interstate management, fishing license
revenues used to finance protection of fisheries, and the adoption of a comprehen-
sive fisheries management policy), id. at 51, and (5) natural features protection,
including protection of dunes, bluffs, steep shore areas and barrier beaches, a
strategy of retreat in coastal hazard areas, minimum development setbacks, limi-
tations of subsidies for building in coastal hazard areas, proper dredging disposal,
higher priority on enforcement of environmental laws in coastal areas, and recov-
ery of natural resource damages monies, id. at 55.
60 Id. at 49-50. Government agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and state agencies have been supplemented by conser-
vation organizations such as the Natural Conservancy, the Trust for Public
Lands, and the rapidly growing number of local land trusts nationwide. Id. at 45.
" Id. at 63.
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management. 2 OGS may be able to learn some valuable lessons
from these groups in terms of identifying underwater lands that
should be reserved and not be available for sale or lease.
In conclusion, regardless of the standards it adopts, the state
should develop criteria for determining whether it is appropriate to
convey any interest in a parcel. Further, the state should identify
biologically rich underwater land areas, as well as those sheltering
important natural resources (e.g., threatened or endangered spe-
cies) as a critical first step in fulfilling this initial responsibility of
determining whether to consider conveying certain parcels.63
Second, in determining whether to make conveyances and the
appropriate scope of such conveyances, the state should require
evaluations of the environmental impact of proposed convey-
ances." In its recent report, the Governor's Task Force on Coastal
Resources specifically recommended that open space val-
ues-natural resource, scenic, public, or recreational values-be in-
corporated into a review process for state transactions in lands now
or formerly underwater in coastal areas. 5
Third, part of this analysis of the appropriate scope of convey-
ances of state-owned lands underwater should include the appro-
priateness of placing conditions on the proposed use. As the Open
Space Plan notes: "The environmental review process now in place
should be expanded to insure that sensitive parcels are not leased
62 Working with state organizations such as DEC, the Conservancy has worked
to develop natural heritage inventories in all fifty states, including New York. See
generally NEW YORK NATURAL HERITAGE PROGRAM & N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, ECOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES OF NEW YORK STATE (1990). This natu-
ral resource inventory assigns ecological communities and rare species of New
York an "element rank" consisting of global and state rank. Id. app. A at 78. The
rarity of the element throughout the world is reflected in the element's "global
rank," while the state rank is a reflection of relative rarity in New York. See id.
Originally developed to assess and protect the state's biodiversity, the Natural
Heritage Program classification system has developed a standardized set of terms
and concepts for natural resource managers' use in the environmental valuation of
wildlife habitats.
63 A complication in dealing with marine resources is that despite the designa-
tion of protected areas, pollutants are able to be transported in water environ-
ments. See DANIEL L. BOTTOM ET AL., MANAGEMENT OF LIVING MARINE RESOURCES:
A RESEARCH PLAN FOR THE WASHINGTON AND OREGON CONTINENTAL MARGIN 12
(1989) (prepared for the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife).
64 The proposed regulations require such evaluations. Draft Regulations, supra
note 49, at 5-7 (to be codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 270-3.2).
"5 See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 62-63. An important part of
this process involves identifying appropriate conditions in order to balance devel-
opment with preservation.
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or are leased only with appropriate environmental restrictions."6
Finally, assuming that the state decides to make a particular
conveyance, it should set an appropriate fee for the conveyance
based upon the impact a proposed project will have on the state's
resources and on the value of those resources. The Underwater
Lands Bill, however, establishes arbitrary limitations on the
amount of the fee that the state may charge for a conveyance.6
7
Section 75(e)(ii) of the Public Lands Law, passed under the Un-
derwater Lands Bill, limits the annual fee for leases and other con-
veyances for commercial use to a maximum of 2% of the "user's
net annual .. income for structures not in existence on the effec-
tive date" of the law.18 Section 75(e)(iii) limits the annual fee for
residential use even more, to either $100 or $20 per slip, whichever
is less. 9 These arbitrary limitations have the potential to short-
change the state and allow users of state resources to reap a
windfall.
The legislative history for the Underwater Lands Bill does not
provide a rationale for the fee structure the legislature adopted.70
Instead, it raises questions concerning the adequacy and potential
constitutionality of this fee structure.7' The Division of the Budget
commented on the low fees that this fee structure would produce:
[Tihe two percent of net income limit on the amounts which OGS
could charge for leases and easements pertaining to underwater land
on which new structures are built is extremely low in comparison to
the flat rates of nine and seven percent of gross income which other
states such as California and Florida charge for comparable
conveyances.
7 1
In its comments on the Bill, the Department of Environmental
Conservation indicated that the fee structure might need to be re-
visited if it resulted in prohibited gifts of state resources:
Since OGS has a constitutional obligation to charge a fee that is
sufficient to avoid the issue of conveying an interest at a price which
88 CONSERVING OPEN SPACE, supra note 51, at 184.
67 See N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75(7)(e).
68 Id. § 75(7)(e)(ii).
6 Id. § 75(7)(e)(iii).
70 See generally Report on Bills, supra note 29, at 3-4; Memorandum from
Langdon Marsh, Executive Deputy Commissioner to the Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (Aug. 10,
1992) [hereinafter Marsh Memorandum] (on file with author).
71 See Report on Bills, supra note 29, at 5.
72 Id.
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amounts to a prohibited gift of State resources, OGS will need to
monitor the fee caps to determine when and if a legislative adjust-
ment is required."
In promulgating its regulations under the Underwater Lands
Bill, OGS should, to the maximum extent possible, link the
amount of the fee it charges to the impact on the resource of the
proposed use. 4 Under such a regulatory scheme, instead of receiv-
ing subsidies through such arbitrary limitations, users of state re-
sources would be required to pay the full cost of such use. Again,
this would be done by linking the fee the user must pay to the
impairment in the value of the resource that its use will cause.75
A critical issue in creating a fee structure that results in the in-
ternalization of costs involves valuation of the public trust lands
and waters, as well as valuation of the injuries these resources may
sustain from their use through conveyances. Several commentators
have discussed the issue of valuing damages to natural resources in
the context of two federal environmental laws, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA),7I and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). 7 Under CER-
7 Marsh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 3.
7 See Thomas A. Campbell, Natural Resource Damage Assessments: A Glance
Backward and a Look Forward, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 221, 222 (1993) ("To place a
fair value on resources that have previously not been valued is a way of logically
and rationally protecting our environment."). For a discussion of the role of the
environmental laws in requiring parties to internalize costs, see David L. Markell,Internalizing the Costs of Pollution: Trends in U.S. Environmental Policy, 1 J.
CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 43 (1993).
"' See Christine M. Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided by
Natural Resources: Putting a Price on the "Priceless", 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 389,390 (1993) (referring to such an approach as "creating a more efficient use of
scarce resources.") (footnote omitted).
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). In CERCLA, Congress di-
rected the President to promulgate regulations relating to natural resource dam-
ages. Id. § 9651(c). In Executive Order 12,580 of January 23, 1987, the President
delegated this authority to the United States Department of the Interior (DOI),
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988),
which issued such rules. E.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (Mar. 20, 1987) (Type A rules); 52
Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987); 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (Aug. 1, 1986) (Type B rules).
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated portions of these
rules in 1989. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 483(D.C. Cir. 1989); see Raymond J. Kopp et al., Natural Resource Damages: The
Economics Have Shifted After Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior,
20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127 (Apr. 1990); Erik D. Olson, Natural
Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and Colorado Decisions: Where Do
We Go From Here?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,551 (Dec. 1989).
" 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2737 (Supp. 11 1990).
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CLA and OPA, the federal and state governments are considered
to be stewards or trustees of natural resources.7" Recognizing the
analogy, one commentator has called the natural resource damage
provision in CERCLA "[the] statutory analog ... [of] the ... pub-
lic trust doctrine."79 The analogy is equally applicable to OPA.
In his article, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, ° Professor
Cross discusses three analytically different approaches for valuing
natural resources: use value,81 existence value,82 and intrinsic
value.8 3 "Use value is . . . the worth of natural resources to people
who use them." It includes both consumptive uses of natural re-
sources, such as fishing and hunting, farming, and mining, and
non-consumptive uses, such as bird watching or relaxing. 5 Deter-
mining actual use of specific natural resources is one technique for
valuing such resources."
There are several potential flaws associated with relying exclu-
sively on "use value." First, some properties may actually decrease
in "environmental value" and monetary value as public use in-
78 See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(d) (allowing the President to set liability limits); 42
U.S.C. § 9651(c) (authorizing the President to promulgate regulations). Since the
district court's decision to invalidate portions of these regulations, both DOI
under CERCLA and the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have been engaged in rulemaking proceed-
ings to promulgate regulatory schemes for valuing natural resource damages that
will address the court's concerns. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 1062 (Jan. 7, 1994) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990). As of January 1994, NOAA had published eight Fed-
eral Register notices since 1990 requesting comments on valuing natural resource
damages. Id. The U.S. Department of Interior also reopened its comment period
for a proposed rule on July 22, 1993. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,328 (July 22, 1993) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11).
11 Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Resource Damages Pro-
vision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine into Natural Resource Dam-
age Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 353, 354 (1992); see also John G. Gleeson et al.,
Defending Natural Resources Damage Claims: Minimizing the Liability of Re-
sponsible Parties, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 281, 284 (1993) ("Congress expanded
the common law public trust doctrine within the natural resources damages provi-
sions of CERCLA.").
80 Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269
(1989).
8 Id. at 281-84.
82 Id. at 285-92.
8 Id. at 292-97.
84 Id. at 281.
11 Id. In terms of the degree of consumptive and non-consumptive use, a
United States Department of Agriculture study found that in 1975, Americans
devoted 478 million days to sport hunting, and more than 1.6 billion days to the
observation of wildlife. Id. n.55.
86 Id.
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creases.87 For example, heavy use of shore areas uproots bottom
plants, erodes shorelines, increases water contamination such as
lead and oil contamination, and increases fish disease and death
rates.8 Second, use value "ignores the reality that natural re-
sources may have worth beyond their [actual] use by humans. ''89
This value of a resource beyond its use value is known as "exis-
tence value." 90 Accordingly, to capture fully the value of a natural
resource, the valuation process should extend beyond determining
use value and include this existence value.
Existence value may be defined as the value which humans re-
ceive simply by knowing that a particular resource exists.9' The
New York Court of Appeals recognized the legitimacy of protecting
existence value as a basis for governmental exercise of its police
power functions, noting that " 'the police power is not to be limited
to guarding merely the physical and material interests of the citi-
zen. His moral, intellectual and spiritual needs may also be consid-
ered. The eagle is preserved, not for its use but for its beauty.' ",92
Natural resource economists have described existence value in
three forms: option value, vicarious value, and intertemporal
value." "Option value," as adopted from private market "option"
concepts,94 assigns a value to what individuals will pay for the op-
tion of preserving a certain natural resource for some future use.9
An example is the amount a person would pay for the option of
seeing the Grand Canyon at some point later in life. 6 A second
example, in which a resource's option value actually was consid-
ered in the decision-making process, involved a proposal to flood
87 See Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type
and Scale of Development in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11-12
(1992).
88 Id. at 11.
89 Cross, supra note 80, at 284.
" Id. at 285.
91 Id.
92 A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 264 N.E.2d 118, 123 (N.Y. 1970) (quoting
Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1917)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Rep-
tile Products Ass'n v. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971). The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the inclusion of "existence" or "passive-use" val-
ues as long as they could be measured reliably. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
" Cross, supra note 80, at 285-86.
" For example, in the market for various commodities, a private market hasdeveloped for the "option or right to [purchase or] use [the] product" in the fu-
ture. Id. at 286.
95 Id.
96 Id.
1994] 115
ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH.
the Hells Canyon portion of the lower Snake River for a hydroelec-
tric project. Hells Canyon was preserved when the natural resource
economist John Krutilla developed the concept that:
The value of the option to retain the canyon in its original state in
anticipation of its rapidly increasing scarcity and value in the future
increased its present value substantially. The "option value" of in-
creasingly scarce, undeveloped lands should be an important compo-
nent in determining the fee structure and length of any leases for
uses of these lands.9 7
"Vicarious value" is an expression of willingness to pay for the
existence of natural resources that the individual is unlikely to
ever use or even see.
9
" For example, individuals often express a
willingness to pay some amount for the protection of endangered
species such as whales or wolves.99 One commentator has suggested
that broad-based membership in environmental organizations may
serve as an indirect measure of the vicarious value of environmen-
tal concerns.1"'
"Intertemporal value" reflects the current generation's concern
that resources be preserved for subsequent generations.
10 1 Adher-
ents of intertemporal existence values reject the philosophy that
"today trumps tomorrow," thereby discounting environmental
quality available to future generations. 2 Instead, they emphasize
the continuity of life, and the need to preserve, rather than dissi-
pate, our natural resources for future generations. '
Several criticisms of existence value as a basis for measuring the
value of natural resources have been made. These criticisms cite
potential difficulties in measurement,0 4 the fact that although in-
dividuals may speculate on what they might pay to preserve a re-
source, they may not necessarily follow through with actual use
and in the end, "put their money where their mouth[] [is]," 10 5 and
17 Victoria Adams & Bill Mundy, The Valuation of High Amenity Natural
Land, APPRAISAL J. 48, 50-51 (1991).
98 See Cross, supra note 80, at 287.
9' Id. at 287-88.
100 Id. at 288 & n.86; see John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 777, 781 (1967).
101 Cross, supra note 80, at 288; see HOLMES ROLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETH-
ics 277-78 (1988).
102 ROLSTON, supra note 101, at 277-78.
103 Id.
104 Cross, supra note 80, at 289.
105 Patrick T. Michael III, Comment, Natural Resource Damages Under CER-
CLA: The Emerging Champion of Environmental Enforcement, 20 PEPP. L. REV.
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its focus on value to humans." 6 Despite these criticisms, the con-
cept of existence value captures several reasons why certain natu-
ral resources have value. Accordingly, existence value should be
used as one tool to value the lands and waters covered by the Un-
derwater Lands Bill, and to determine appropriate fees for such
conveyances.
Finally, intrinsic value represents the belief that natural things
have inherent worth of their own, independent of their value to
humans.10 7 "Deep ecologists" believe that "all living things 'have
inherent value and ... moral significance independent of their use
by human beings, or even of human existence.' "1o In order to cap-
ture all costs and internalize them, assuming that use of the re-
source will be permitted, the intrinsic value of the resource should
be considered as well.109
185, 198 (1992).
106 See Cross, supra note 80, at 290.
107 Id. at 293. Some proponents of intrinsic value reject the legitimacy of plac-
ing monetary values on natural resources. They argue that the concept of as-
signing monetary value and even the words "natural resources" reflect the human
bias. See id. at 293-94. These proponents believe that the word "resource" repre-
sents the idea that animals, minerals, or waters, for example, exist only as "re-
sources" for man's use. See id. at 294-95.
108 Id. (quoting P.S. Elder, Legal Rights for Nature-The Wrong Answer to
the Right(s) Question, 22 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 285, 286 (1984)).
109 Analytically, it appears that this should be the case both for uses of natural
resources authorized under the Underwater Lands Bill and for uses authorized
under various regulatory programs. As an example of the latter situation, why
shouldn't a facility that emits into the air sulfur dioxide that ultimately ends upin a lake, thereby rendering the lake unfit as a habitat for fish, pay for the injury
that it has caused to that lake?
As noted above, some members of the environmental community are not pre-
pared to concede the appropriateness of a party's paying to destroy or impair a
natural resource. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 80, at 305. If, however, the alterna-
tive is to allow such destruction or impairment to occur without requiring the
actor to internalize its costs, the better approach appears to improve the method-
ology that is used so that it fully recovers for the harm that an act has or will
cause. Another alternative is to bar the activity.
In at least one statute, Congress has recognized the impossibility, in most in-
stances, of "monetizing" the value of natural resources or their destruction. See
generally Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544. In the Endangered
Species Act, Congress found that the benefits of maintaining species were "incal-
culable," and therefore it was impossible to conduct a meaningful cost-benefit
analysis. H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973). As the Supreme Court
held in the famous "snail darter" case, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.153 (1978), if a project jeopardizes the continued existence of an endangered spe-
cies or will result in the destruction or modification of its critical habitat, the
project may not go forward. Id. at 173. The project was subject to an absolute bar.
Id. at 172. However, this bar was relaxed somewhat in the 1982 amendments to
the Endangered Species Act, which allowed the proponent of an action barred by
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In sum, although no single approach is definitive in terms of nat-
ural resource valuation, the field of natural resource damage eco-
nomics identifies several approaches that OGS should consider in
setting monetary fees for the use of public trust lands in New York
State. The important analytical point is that the fee that a party is
charged to use a resource should reflect the impact on the value of
the resource that the use will have. 110 In fulfilling its responsibility
under the Underwater Lands Bill, OGS should consider these les-
sons from CERCLA-based natural resource damages economics
theory.
C. A Miscellaneous Feature of the Underwater Lands Bill
One feature that the Underwater Lands Bill lacks that warrants
further scrutiny by the legislature is a citizen suit provision. Citi-
zens can play an important role in protecting natural resources.
This is especially true in difficult fiscal times such as that New
York has experienced in recent years. And it seems particularly ap-
propriate to provide express statutory authority that empowers cit-
izens to act to protect public trust resources."
III. A FINAL RECENT DEVELOPMENT AFFECTING PUBLIC TRUST
LANDS WHICH DESERVES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
An issue that has received virtually no attention in the public
trust literature, so far as this author is aware, relates to the CER-
CLA liability that a state may be exposed to in its capacity as
owner of public trust resources.1"2 CERCLA makes four categories
a "jeopardy" determination to seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endan-
gered Species Committee. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g).
110 See N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8; Marsh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 3.
"' For a discussion of citizen suit provisions relating to natural resources dam-
ages actions under CERCLA, see Olson, supra note 76, at 10,552-53.
1'2 Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), four clas-
ses of persons are strictly liable for Superfund sites: (1) the present owner or
operator of such sites; (2) persons who owned or operated such sites at the time of
disposal of hazardous substances; (3) persons who arranged for the disposal, treat-
ment, or transport of hazardous substances at the sites; and (4) persons who ac-
cept or accepted hazardous substances for transport to such sites. Id.
§ 9607(a)(1)-(4). These persons are liable for a wide variety of costs set out in 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D), including the costs for "damages for injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources .... ." Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C). Congress in-
tended this statutory scheme to be very strict and "hoped [it] would give the
government a very strong hand in deciding 'who pays' for cleaning up Love Canal
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of parties liable for hazardous substances sites, including owners of
such sites and, in some situations, previous owners of the sites."13
The Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 1 1 4 that
in CERCLA, Congress waived the sovereign immunity of states to
suit." 5 A recent district court decision from Pennsylvania held the
State of Pennsylvania liable for a Superfund site due to its status
as owner of a navigable water." 6 While the decision did not so
state explicitly, it appears that the state's ownership of the water
stemmed from the public trust doctrine, that is, from the fact that
the water, as a navigable water, was covered by the public trust
doctrine and therefore was owned by the state." 7 The water be-
came contaminated and required cleanup." 8 The Court held the
state liable for 25% of the costs of remediation." 9 Accordingly,
states may face liability under CERCLA for contamination of
state-owned lands and waters.'20
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its centuries-old history, issues relating to the appropri-
ate scope and uses of the public trust doctrine continue to perco-
late. "' The recently enacted Underwater Lands Bill raises many of
and similar sites." David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposalsfor Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L.
1, 12 (1993).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
114 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
118 Id. at 13.
16 United States v. Union Gas Co., 35 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1750, 1757 (E.D.
Pa. 1992).
"' See id. at 1751-52.
1 Id. at 1754.
lie Id. at 1758.
120 E.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., 36 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1372, 1373
(S.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that a bank, as the trustee of an Illinois land trust, is not
the owner of a facility under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and therefore is not
subject to CERCLA liability). The district court found that, in the bank's capac-
ity as trustee of an Illinois land trust, the bank did not control the management
of the land and received no benefit from the land. Id. at 1374. Instead, the bank
only had power to convey title to the land with the authorization of the benefi-
ciary. Id. The court held that because an "owner" of a facility under CERCLA
must have some amount of control over, or receive some benefit from the land,
the defendant bank was not liable under CERCLA. Id. at 1376.
121 Professor Rodgers' statement in 1984 that "[t]he public trust doctrine con-
tinues to be a subject of fascination to the commentators" holds true today. ROD-
GERS, supra note 1, § 2.16, at 59. Since the release of Rodgers' 1984 supplement,
the pace of academic activity promoting, interpreting, and criticizing the public
trust doctrine has continued to be fast and furious.
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these issues in a concrete context. New York should use the oppor-
tunity that this statute presents to consider carefully how best to
integrate its public trust and police power responsibilities in order
to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Furthermore, the state should systematically evaluate which of
its resources should be "reserved." It also needs to address how
best to value use of its resources, and it needs to decide to what
extent it is appropriate to link the fees it charges for use of these
resources to the value of the resources and to the injuries that such
use causes. Developments in natural resource damages economics
under CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990122 should help
the state to make progress in exercising both its public trust and
police power responsibilities in this area.
Third, especially in the context of public trust resources, the
state needs to actively pursue approaches for further democratiz-
ing its system of government by empowering citizens to act to pro-
tect such resources.
In closing, the recent Union Gas decision '2 3 highlights the im-
portance of integrating "public trust" and "police power" func-
tions. If the state risks CERCLA and other liability due to its
status as the owner or former owner of public trust resources, it
needs to exercise its public trust and police power responsibilities
so as to minimize the likelihood of such exposure. In that sense,
this recent decision may be an incentive to build on the steps to-
ward integration of these functions begun by the Underwater
Lands Bill. In this author's view, this decision will have furthered
an important public interest if it does so.
:22 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2737 (Supp. II 1990).
123 United States v. Union Gas Co., 35 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1750 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
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